PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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SCHOOL AND WELLESLEY COLLEGE ASSOCIATIONS

CIA AUDITORIUM

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BILLY DOSWELL : ...My name is Billy DOSWELL . I'm the Director of External Affairs for the CIA. And on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, we welcome you.

We have a program this evening that I think you will find both informative and pleasant. We're going to have a twenty minute slide presentation on the Central Intelligence Agency, and then some remarks -- we had scheduled some remarks by Mr. Casey. But because Mr. Casey has an emergency, we have changed the program around, and Mr. Casey will address you first, and then we'll have the slide presentation, and then we'll take you through a tunnel -- you don't have to be apprenhensive about that; there's nothing ominous about it -- over to an area that you'll have some refreshments.

There are many Harvard alumni and alumnae here among you, and they will be over there too, so please make yourself known to them. They would like to chat with you.

He needs no introduction. So without further ado, it's my pleasure to present to you the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. William J. Casey.

[Applause]

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY: Thank you.

All of us at CIA are pleased to welcome you here to our headquarters. I've always a little apologetic about this that we've got nothing to show you but rooms and desks and papers and computers. That's because intelligence is mostly people and paper carrying photographs or messages or analysis of some kind or another. We do find here -- we do find more and more computers, and they tend to squeeze people out of the building. And as a result, both people and computers have flowed into many other buildings in the Capitol district.

The American intelligence network is actually, for the most part, an intangible thing. It's a network of trained people working in the military and diplomatic services here in the CIA, in signals and photographic work, in analytical and estimating work, and in gathering bits of information all over the world.

Intelligence has many facets. It's a very uncertain, fragile and complex commodity. First, you have to get a report. Then you have to decide whether it's real or fake. Then whether it's true or false as you find out what other intelligence supports or contradicts it. Then you fit it into some kind of a broad mosaic. Then someone has to figure out what it all means. Then you have to get the attention of somebody who can make a decision. And then you have to get him to act.

Over the years my predecessors in this building have changed intelligence and made it far more than the simple spy

service it is frequently perceived and perhaps began to be. They developed a great center of scholarship and research, with as many doctors and masters in every kind of art and science as any university campus. They have produced a triumph of technology, stretching from the depths of the ocean to the limits of outer space. Using photography, electronics, acoustics and other technological marvels, we learn things totally hidden on the other side of the world.

In the SALT debate, for example, you remember Americans openly discussing the details of Soviet missiles, which are held most secret in the Soviet Union, but are revealed by this intelligence apparatus that has been created here.

All this produces a staggering array of facts, a veritable Niagara of information. But facts can confuse. The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. And no photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct, on-the-scene knowledge of the key actors in a given country or region. Technical collection is of little help in the most important and difficult problem of all, political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference.

Now the highest duty, major responsibility of a Director of Central Intelligence is to produce solid and perceptive national intelligence estimates relevant to the issues which the President, the National Security Council need to concern themselves with. When General Bedell Smith took office as Director of Central Intelligence, he was told the first day that President Truman was

leaving in 20 hours to consult with General MacArthur on Wake Island and that the President would want intelligence estimates on seven issues to study on the plane. So General Smith assembled the chiefs of the intelligence community in the Pentagon at 4:00 PM and divided them and their staffs into seven groups, told them they would work all night and have their assigned estimate ready for delivery at 8:00 AM. President Truman has his estimates as he took off for his discussions with General MacArthur.

I have to coonfess that we work a little more deliverately today.

Over the years, and particularly during the last decade, a lot of criticism has been levied at our national intelligence estimates. Much of it is based unrealistic expectations of what an intelligence service can do. The CIA does not have powers of prophecy. It has no crystal ball that can peer into the future with 20/20 sight. We are dealing with probable developments, probabilities. If we can't expect infallible prophecy from the nation's large investment in intelligence, what can we expect?

Well, we can expect foresight. We can expect a careful delineation of possibilities. We can expect professional analysts to prove and weigh probabilities and assess their implications. We can expect analysis that assists policy-makers in devising ways to prepare for and cope with the full range of probabilities. The President doesn't need a guru or a single best view. He and the nation need the best analysis and the full range of views it can get.

The process of analysis and arriving at estimates needs to remain as open and competitive as possible. We need to resist the bureaucratic urge for consensus. We don't need analysts spending their time in finding a middle ground or papering over [or using] weasel words to conceal disagreement. The search for consensus cultivates the myth of infallibility and implicitly promises a reliability that can't be delivered, and too frequently it deprives the intelligence product of relevance and the policy-maker of the range of possibilities for which prudence requires that he prepare. There's no future certainty. It's a matter of the range of expectations that have to be prepared for.

And above all, the policy-maker needs to be protected from the conventional wisdom. Let me give you some horrible examples.

At the end of World War II, we had the atomic bomb, and almost everyone that counted was convinced that the Soviets did not have and would not soon acquire the technological or industrial capability to build that weapon. Two men, Senator Brian McMahon and Lewis Strauss, then a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, performed one of the most important intelligence missions in the history of our nation. Together they insisted that we had to immediately develop a program to monitor and detect all large explosions that occurred at any place on the earth. This effort was launched in the nick of time to establish that an atomic explosion had occurred somewhere in the Asiatic mainland and at some date between August 26th and August 29th in 1949. Had there been no

monitoring system in operation that year, the Russian success in developing an atom bomb in that summer would have been unknown to us. In consequence, we would not have made the attempt to develop the thermonuclear weapon. It was our positive intelligence that the Russians had exploded an atomic bomb which generated the recommendation to develop the qualitatively superior hydrogen, thus to maintain our military superiority at that time.

Had we relied on the conventional wisdom about Soviet nuclear capability, the Russian success in developing thermonuclear weapon capability in 1953, only four years later, would have found the United States hopelessly outdistanced, and the Soviet military would have had possession of weapons vastly more powerful than any that we had.

Another example. In 1962, John McCone came here at Director of Central Intelligence, and he learned about the arrival of anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba. What are they there to protect, he wondered; not sugar cane; not the tiny Cuban industrial structure. And he concluded that there were no targets now to justify those defensive weapons. So they must intend to bring something there which will need to be attacked, and hence will need to be defended. Thus he was many months ahead of anyone else in Washington in predicting the possibility that Moscow might base offensive missiles in Cuba.

When Cuban refugees brought reports that large missiles were being brought in and installed, McCone was confirmed in his tentative forecast while everyone else in Washington had dismissed

them on the basis that the Soviets would never do anything so foolish as to plant offensive missiles in Cuba. The U-2 pictures came along showing that there were indeed Soviet missiles in Cuba, and that kind of evidence cannot be denied.

Now to protect against the homogenized estimate and the conventional wisdom, the CIA, military intelligence and every other element of the intelligence community should not only be allowed to compete and surface differences, but be encouraged to do so. The way we work today, the chiefs of all the intelligence agencies in what we call the intelligence community -- that's CIA, State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force intelligence, FBI, Treasury with its economic intelligence, Energy with its nuclear intelligence -- the chiefs of those organizations sit every week or every two week as a board of estimates to review national intelligence estimates on issues relevant to the policy decisions which the National Security Council or the President or other national security elements of the government, or domestic policy elements on economic matters, for that matter, will be facing.

As DCI, I am charged with formulating the estimate, and I have the concommitant responsibility to see that all credible and substantiated alternative views are properly and fully reflected. In this way, policy-makers get a look at a range of probabilities and are protected from the conventional wisdom.

Now we also need to recognize, and we do, that the intelligence community has no monopoly on truth, on insight and on

initiative in foreseeing what will be relevant to policy. For that reason, we are in the process of activating a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board made up of strong and experienced individuals with a wide range of relevant backgrounds. And to get all the intelligence we need, we must look still further beyond the formal intelligence organizations. We need to tap all the scholarly resources of the nation and the perspectives that Americans generally develop in their activities around the world. And we are geared to do that in open and direct contact with campuses, think tanks and business organizations around the country. And we will need to do more of this in the future to cope with the requirements of an increasingly complex and dangerous world as it generates new threats.

In the simple days of World War II, we were doing pretty well if we knew where the enemy was and where he was redeploying his forces. And for the first twenty years of peacetime intelligence, most of the effort went into understanding the production and capabilities of potentially hostile weapons. And it's only in this last decade that it has dawned upon us that we have been more threatened and damaged by coups and subversion and economic aggression than by military force.

We still need to [devote] a large slice of effort to military estimates and rely very heavily on them in formulating defense budgets, weapons development and force structures. But this must be supplemented by increased efforts to assess economic vulnerabilities and search for technological breakthroughs. And increasingly

priority attention needs to go to identifying social and political instabilities and how they can or are being exploited by propaganda, by subversion, by terrorism and so on.

So much for the kind of intelligence capabilities we have and need to develop. Let me say a few words about what we face.

Our first priority is still the Soviet Union. It's been the number one adversary for 35 years. It's the only country in the world with major weapons systems directly targeted at the United States, which could destroy it in half an hour. And for that reason alone, it remains the number one concern and target.

And less lethal, but perhaps more dangerous is the threat of worldwide subversion and insurrection and tiny wars of so-called national liberation. Over the last five years, we've seen the combination of Cuban manpower, Libyan money, and Soviet arms and planes and other transport substantially seize and thoroughly threaten the African continent from Angola to Ethiopia, and across the continent through the Sudan and Chad, to the Western Sahara and the fringes of Arabia.

We've seen the same forces take over Nicaragua and threaten the rest of Central America. We see the crossroads and the oil resources of the Middle East threatened from Iran and Afghanistan from the east, Syria from the north, Yemen from the south, and Libya from the west; all of these countries literally stuffed with Soviet weapons.

And there are many levels at which this contest is carried

on today, all of which need to be addressed.

First, there is the strategic arena, in which the increasing accuracy and power of Soviet missiles thoroughly suppresses the survivability of our own land-based missiles. This has led to a presidential decision to accelerate the strengthening of our air and sea retaliatory capability and to basically defer the decision on the basing of more powerful land-based missiles until we can better evaluate the role that anti-missile defense and versatile cruise missiles can play in maintaining a credible land-based capability or deterrence.

Secondly, on the Central European front, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops vastly outnumber NATO forces and tanks and planes and soldiers.

Thirdly, in the ability to project military power over long distances, the Soviets, together with their Cuban proxies, have demonstrated a capability to project as far as Angola or Ethiopia. Today, there are some twenty Soviet divisions on the northern borders of Iran, and a strike at the Persian Gulf has the potential to shut down the industrial machine of the West, while the rapid deployment force that we have recently created remains untested.

Fourthly, there is the ability to destablize governments on any continent and follow up with support for subversion and insurgency. In numbers and experience and freedom to act, the ability of the Soviets, through its KGB and local communist parties to subvert other governments and propagandize in other

countries is unrivaled. This ability is now being backed up by worldwide supply and military equipment and advisers. A few years ago, the United States was providing twice as much military equipment to the Third World countries as Russia was providing. Today, the Soviet Union is providing 50% more equipment to a larger number of Third World countries, and military advice and influence go along with these relationships. And the Soviets, along with their Eastern European satellites -- Libya, Cuba and the PLO -- engage in the widespread training of guerrilla fighters and terrorists, encourage them to destabilize governments, and thus lay the groundwork for support of revolutionary violence. Wherever an insurgency can be launched, sophisticated external support can so disrupt the economy as to create popular dissatisfactions, which then, in turn, feed and compound insurgent forces. We see that in Central America and elsewhere today.

And fifthly, there is the technological race. Large and specialized segments of the KGB and Soviet military intelligence, together with trade and scientific delegations roaming the advanced world, are acquiring Western technology at a very rapid pace. In effect, this permits the Soviets to use our research and development to build sophisticated weapons which we have to defend against, and also to reduce the drain which spending 50% more on the military than we do imposes on the Soviet economy. And as we look back, it becomes increasingly clear that for the accuracy, versatility and control of their military arsenal, the Soviets have borrowed from our technology to a degree which we have only recently come to

recognize.

In addition, the magnitude and the military thrust of the Soviet space and laser programs require a constant watch against a technological breakthrough which could tipe the balance of power in the world.

So this is the range of the threat, so much of it new and beyond the traditional range of the capabilities of Western intelligence.

Looking at the world more broadly, what do we see? We see a Soviet Union rapidly building its military strength as ours is permitted to decline. We see the United States falling behind in economic competitiveness as the Japanese and the Germans save, invest and innovate more, and Koreans, Singapore, Taiwanese, Brazilians, Mexicans increasing their share of the world market as ours diminishes. And this results in economic strength, up or down.

We see political and economic instability in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America where we get the fuel and minerals to keep our economy going. The Soviet Union, with its Cuban, East German, Libyan and Syrian proxies, demonstrate a remarkable ability to exploit these instabilities by well orchestrated subversion and paramilitary operations conducted with guerrilla fighters they train, equip and direct.

We see large numbers of tanks and guns stockpiled in Syria, Libya and Yemen on the fringe of the Arab peninsula and transported to Nicaragua and Cuba, Angola and Ethiopia, and used in Chad and Lebanon, El Salvador and Guatemala.

Yet the outlook is not all black and dreary. Russia has fallen into a hornet's nest in Afghanistan, where, after 18 months, they control less of the country than they did at the outset and where freedom fighters confine Soviet troops to a half-dozen cities, the main roads and to their barracks at night.

In Poland, the Soviets are caught in a dilemma between concern that developments there could unravel the communist system, while supression would entail heavy economic and political costs and bring bloodshed and prolonged resistance from militant Poles.

And the Soviet economy gasps under its inherent inefficiences and the burden of enormous military expenditures, plus the costs of empire -- many billions each year to Cuba and Vietnam; cut-rate oil to East European satellites; hugh worldwide propaganda and trouble-making machines; and sprinkling guns in Africa, the Middle East and Central America.

What will count here and around the world is a renewal of confidence in our people and among other nations in the strength of purpose and in the reliability of the United States to do what needs to be done to make our own society stronger and more efficient and to work with our friends and allies in support of freedom and justice around the world.

So that's all I have to say. I'll be happy to -- I guess I have fifteen minutes -- ten minutes in which I can answer -- take some questions.

No questions?

Yes?

Q: [Inaudible.]

DIRECTOR CASEY: Perhaps. Perhaps. In some cases, it is. In most cases, in a great many cases, in cases, a number of cases I can cite, and I can cite this at all stages in the development of an insurrection, there is always a basis of popular discontent, which exists everywhere. I am talking about the situation where that popular discontent is fanned and taken by external support to a stage of hostilities which would not be likely or possible without that external support. I'm talking about situations where a very small and tiny group of political forces are brought together by the Cubans or they're brought to Havana or Mexico City or Moscow, they're urged to pull together, to consolidate; they're told if they do that, they will get weapons, they will get instructors, they will get direction, they'll get communications; and what discontents which we would hope and we would expect to be worked out through some kind of governmental process or a political process become transformed and built up into revolutionary violence.

Now you can take your pick, issue by issue, country by country. I don't want to get into that quarrel. There're just too many situations around the world where the kind of conflict that gets worked out in a non-violent way is suddenly transformed and inflamed into civil war by external infusions of leadership, trained people and weapons.

Yes?

Q: Can you make more clear for me what kinds of informa-

tion gathering techniques have been -- from which the CIA has been restrained or prohibited in the last three or four years and which this administration seeks to return to the CIA....?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I would first like to say that the last thing in the world the CIA wants to do is to spy on Americans, as the press has been heralding.

[Comment from audience inaudible.]

DIRECTOR CASEY: Yeah, I recognize it.

[Laughter.]

The job of the CIA and all elements in the intelligence community is to develop foreign intelligence relative to the national security and national interests of the United States. We've operated under an executive order for some years, which is rather negative in thrust and requires people working abroad to work through 130 pages of rules and regulations to determine what they can do when. This has the effect -- since most of these fellows aren't lawyers, but operators, it has the effect of turning them off. They say "Well, let's forget the whole thing." It was that difficult.

Now what we've done is simplify that executive order, made it possible to reduce those instructions from 130 pages to something like 30 pages, without in any way impairing the protections that Americans have by law and under the Constitution. And that is recited time and again in the executive order.

To be more specific, just one instance. This is a long story; I don't want to spend too much time on it. Under the old

order, if there was reason to worry or think about whether an American or a resident alien abroad was in contact with a hostile intelligence service, there was a prohibition against doing a surveillance, following him and watching him to see whether he was indeed and for what purpose, unless you could establish he was an agent of a foreign power. So to determine what you were trying to find out, you had to know in advance.

Now that's been modified so that in an authorized intelligence or foreign intelligence investigation, it's possible to conduct physical surveillance of an American abroad. Not here; abroad. Here, the FBI has that authority in the United States. That doesn't apply to wire-tapping, eavesdropping, electronic surveillance, for which you need a court order any way.

Another area. There are lots of Americans who have contacts and experience abroad who want to help in foreign intelligence. For the purpose of coming into contact with those Americans, it's been the practice to approach Americans directly, seek their cooperation, and to join organizations for the purpose of meeting them for that purpose. There was some question about that. But that is to be restored in this order.

I think that's the thing that people think of as spying on Americans. It's merely for soliciting the assistance of Americans who can assist in foreign intelligence.

Yes?

Q: There's been a lot in the news lately about former CIA agents going to work for the Libyans and the Cubans. Is that a

serious problem, and does that pose much of a threat to....?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, we don't like it. In fact, the fact is, however, that the handful of people who left the agency, as far as we can ascertain now, five or ten years ago, when this came to public light, when the agency became aware of it under George Bush and Admiral Turner, it was investigated fully; relevant information was turned over to the Justice Department; prosecutions have been conducted, and we spent a lot of time thinking about how you can control this. The problem is not really a CIA problem. It's a problem of the fact that there are mercenaries in the world. And it's a business. And we'd like to keep people who stay here and learn the trade and retire out of the business. The degree to which we can do that without running across or violating constitutional limitations, raising other legal and practical questions in terms of our ability to get good talent, and so on, has caused us to go rather carefully. And we're awaiting some investigation and considering some possible legislative solutions in an inquiry which the House Intelligence Committee is presently conducting.

I'd like to add that the people involved in this are certainly less than ten among retirees who number many thousands.

Q: Given the closed nature of the society and restrictions placed on our intelligence services in Saudi Arabia, are you satisfied that we will be able to predict events pertaining to the stability or instability in that country?

DIRECTOR CASEY: I'm satisfied that we have a pretty good

hold on the forces that make for stability, that we can make good judgments. I wouldn't want to guarantee they'll be correct.

Any other questions?

Q: Yes. Would you talk about the relationship of the Soviets with the IRA?

DIRECTOR CASEY: I have not concerned myself with that. I know that -- I can say that some years ago the IRA got some weapons from the Libyans and from Warsaw Pact countries, Bulgaria, something like that. And I think apart from that, I don't think there's any involvement that can be identified. The IRA has become a kind of Marxist oriented philosophical movement. But that doesn't establish Soviet influence.

Yeah?

Q: Director, one of Jack Anderson's latest criticisms was that it cost too much money to gather intelligence by mechanical means and using all the computers whereas human intelligence, a few good agents do the job more cheaper. Do you have any comment on that?

DIRECTOR CASEY: The trick is getting those few good agents who can do one job.

No, I think you've got to use all sources to get any reasonable certainty you know what's going on. And the human agents identify where the technical means can be pointed. The technical collection means develop situations which need to be examined more closely by human agents. And there's got to be a mutually supporting relationship between the two.

It's true that the technical means are expensive. But it's a lot more expensive to not know what you're doing when you're spending huge amounts of money on weapons and other defense and foreign policy purposes. And I talked about technological breakthroughs and the dangers that could occur. Right now there are sophisticated technological means of following some of the potential breakthroughs much more closely that will take big -- major budget decisions. I think they will have to be made, because you just can't take the risk that your adversary can come up with something that will totally tip the balance of power and put you at his mercy without knowing about it, if you have the possibility you can do it.

Yeah?

Q: Would you just briefly comment on the security implications of the recent agreement between Russia and various European countries for the transportation of natural gas?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I think the security implications are that that deal will help the Soviets build and expand their military machine. With German and European investment, they will be able to build a facility that will keep them in hard currency starting at about 1984, '85, where otherwise we don't see where they'd have the hard currency to bring in, continue to bring in the Western technology and the Western goods that helps them build and maintain their military machine. I think the hard currency aspect is more important than the aspect that you most frequently read about in the press; namely, that it creates a dependency which could be shut off the Soviets shut off the gas. I think the Soviets

will keep the gas going and take the cash. And the influence is the ability to use that cash to make employment in Western Europe dependent upon their purchases; in other words, develop political leverage and promote the potential for dividing Europe and the United States in the alliance.

Yes?

Q: Could you address the risks of politicizing intelligence?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I don't think they're very great. Certainly nobody wants to. Certainly, if we maintain a system under which we bring together the chiefs of the components of the intelligence community and get around the table and the ultimate output is one in which they all have their say, and if they have any serious differences those differences will be articulated -- and that's a policy we've only really been implementing this year. Way back it was done. It hadn't been done for a while with this process of homogenizing the product. I think that's a substantial protection against politicalization.

Yes?

Q: What....

DIRECTOR CASEY: I think the other thing is that this is an organization of career people who have dedicated themselves to this career and stay with it remarkably in the face of ability to take more money. Two-thirds of our senior employees here in the upper echela side are eligible for retirement, because there is a 50 year retirement in the career service. And they stay with us

because they're dedicated to the work. And these people are not going to be politicalized.

Q: What is the agency doing, indeed what can it do, to protect itself against people like Agee?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, we hope we will get some legislation that will remedy that. It's been passed by the House, and it is out of the Senate committee; it will be voted on this month, or certainly early in January, which will make it a crime to go around disclosing the names of people who are working on a basis that their names and identity will be secured, and just doing that for the purpose of destroying American intelligence, which is the announced purpose of many of these publications, and Agee, if that's the way you pronounce his name. I think that legislation will put a crimp in that activity.

Back row.

Q: Do you intend to write a book about your experiences with the CIA?

[Laughter.]

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, I tell you. I've already written 30 books so far. But I have no present intentions, nor do I have time to think about it.

Yes?

Q: Has the agency found it more difficult in recent years to get qualified people, particularly those with foreign language abilities and technical skills than in the past?

DIRECTOR CASEY: Well, we're doing better in recruiting

and getting people, young people, than we had been doing. The language problem is a serious one, primarily because they've almost stopped teaching languages in American institutions of higher education, not to say secondary education. So we just don't have the same kind of a pool of people who have specialized and studied languages than there used to be. And it's a really serious problem. It has to be addressed on an educational level.

Over there in the righthand side of the room. Then I've got to go. One last question.

Q: Yes. I have a question about Colby's book.

DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes.

Q: William Colby's book...

DIRECTOR CASEY: Yes.

Q: I believe it came out in '76. And recently there was some mention in the Post that possibly he might be prosecuted for mentioning the depths to which the Glomar Explorer could operate; I believe 18,000 feet. I was wondering, you know, if this really reflects the policy of....

DIRECTOR CASEY: No. That's a special situation. The agency does have a policy of requiring anybody who works here to sign a commitment that they will not write anything unless it's approved by the agency. And I have signed that agreement.

Now -- so we have a substantial process of clearing people who must write, clearing their products, magazine articles or books or anything else.

Bill Colby wrote a book. The book started out with World

War II and did carry on through his directorship. He submitted it here to be cleared. It was cleared. Through an accident, a copy got into the hands of a French publisher on the understanding he was going to look at it. And he proceeded to get it in print before the clearance had been completed. And there was in it a couple of little -- a few small items that he had agreed to eliminate in the American edition of the book.

Well, this was a mistake, and there was no intent. He intended to do the right thing. In the last administration, the CIA wanted to enforce this right against another book, which will be nameless, where the author had no intent of playing by the game, playing by the rules. And they wanted to bring an action against him under the contract, and the Justice Department said, well, unless you sue Colby, why, we're not going to sue this other fellow. So in order to maintain the credibility of the commitment, which we think is important in the long run, the Justice Department did -- was prepared to bring both these actions. Colby came in and settled it. It had nothing to do with the Glomar. It had nothing to do with -- it was just a kind of a sacrifice he had to make to maintain the credibility of the process. And we were all kind of reluctant that he had to -- well, he paid up the royalty from the French book. That's the story on that. It doesn't reflect in any way on his honorable nature.

Yes?

Q: Was the book by Kermit Roosevelt regarding his experiences in Iran cleared for publication before it was published?

DIRECTOR CASEY: I don't know. I don't know. I wouldn't know that. He might have had his experiences before those contracts were in vogue. I just don't know. I don't follow all these.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]